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ABSTRACT 
 There are countless occasions where marginalized groups bear witness to language-based 
discriminatory practices. Language, as defined here, is a species of symbolism. After reviewing 
the sociological literature, the term “microaggressions” appears to best describe the phenomena 
in its everyday occurrences. Microaggressions are “the brief and commonplace daily verbal, 
behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious 
slights and insults to the target person or group” (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007; Sue, 2010). Sue 
classifies microaggressions into three forms: microassaults, microinsults, microinvalidations. 
The purpose of the project was tri-fold. By an analogous process of inference and conjecture, I 
demonstrate how Sue’s taxonomy of microaggressive forms are grades of subjective intensity 
that are presupposed, if not conceptually integrated. First, an overview of the theory of double 
consciousness and the literature on microaggressions is presented.  Six participants were 
interviewed, analyzed and then classified into Sue’s taxonomy.  Responses indicated that 
microaggressions are real despite their subtle, phantasmal and illusory nature. Additional 
findings suggest that Sue’s microaggressive forms may not only be categorical, but also the locus 
of a proposition, or ‘lure for feeling.’  Implications for these subtle intensities are considered, 
then compared and contrasted with a transmutated concept of Du Boisian double consciousness 
to demonstrate through a theory of perception the limitations of Sue’s Microaggression Process 
Model.  Examples from popular culture are considered throughout the study for added clarity.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 We live in the midst of a seemingly “post-racial” era in which the United States, with its 
documented history of racial atrocities, has elected its first African American president.  With 
this, some argue that the concept of race is no longer important, or that it does not play a 
significant role in the shaping of lives and culture.  The problem is precisely this seemingly 
aspect.  Instead of the deliberate, overt and explicit discriminatory practices that happened in the 
past, in these years of the Obama era, racial prejudices and biases occur on more subtle levels.  
Derogatory epithets like “nigger,” “porch monkey,” “jungle bunny” and “coon” are no longer 
openly accepted.  Although the gains of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, Gay and 
Lesbian, Student Antiwar and Third World Movements slowly forced such terms from use, they 
were ultimately replaced by other slights.  In other words, centuries-old forms of blatant, “old-
fashioned” racism have morphed into subtle, seemingly invisible, ephemeral forms of 
oppression.  
Conservatives and many liberals today argue, that, “Jim [and Jane] Crowism is over,” and 
that people of color, especially African Americans, are the ones responsible for perpetuating the 
“race problem.” While African Americans have made some racial progress on the fronts of 
education, housing, and access to opportunity, racism is far from dead. There remains an 
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inheritable relic from the past that is capable of advancing and perpetuating its detrimental 
realities.  This tension between de facto separatist practices, coupled with the undeniable aspects 
of racial progress (e.g. people aren’t being lynched every day, African American president, etc.) 
is what I am claiming creates a virtual reality, rather than an enriching one.  Virtual reality is 
what I have come to understand as the contradictory and conflicting worldview that generates 
both distorted and secondary realities.  An enriching reality is one that disrupts the sense of 
permanence that often dominates thinking.  Rather, it avoids the idiosyncrasies of particular 
modes or schools of thought. 
After reviewing the sociological literature, the term “microaggression” appears to best 
describe the idea of virtuality that is meant.  Microaggressions are subtle, conscious or 
unconscious, verbal and nonverbal, intentional or unintentional, delivered slights, insults and 
invalidations that send denigrating messages to marginalized persons or groups (Sue, 2010: 40). 
There is a perfect illustration of this experience in The Souls of Black Folk (1903) where Du Bois 
writes: 
I remember well when the shadow swept across me.  I was a little thing, away up 
in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac 
and Taghkanic to the sea.  In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the 
boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—ten cent a package—and 
exchange.  The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my 
card,—refused it peremptorily, with a glance.  Then it dawned upon me with a 
certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart 
and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil (emphasis added; 
2003:5). 
 
This particular passage contains the “sense-experience” or “feeling” of a racist microaggression. 
Certainly, Du Bois attributes her refusal to his race and not, for instance, to something that he 
cannot put his finger on. Microaggressions are experienced by people of color as “real,” 
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“tangible,” and “direct.” The goal of this thesis will be discussing instances of its many 
occasions.  However, it is also the case that microaggressions can be spun and interpreted in 
different ways which do not directly point to race as the source of the slight though it may be.  
The historical development of this concept is, in fact, indispensable to our explaining of 
Sue’s Microaggression Process Model (2010: 65-86). There, Sue identifies and summarizes five 
domain (phases) that are likely to occur during a potential racial microaggression.  The five 
domains include: Incident, Perception, Reaction, Interpretation, and Consequence.   
In the above excerpt, we witness a microaggression at its inception⎯the “Incident Phase” 
of Sue’s taxonomy (i.e., as the raw data of sense perception), or as a “certain suddenness,” as Du 
Bois recalls it. Du Bois’s experience occurs many years before it is given the academic 
euphemism “microaggression.”  We are simply pointing out the sense experience of the 
microaggression at its inception. As presented in the above-mentioned excerpt, it is simply an 
uncomfortable, awkward or even embarrassing moment, yet a feeling and sensation that is 
coupled now with a perception of black-white relations nonetheless.  
There is another helpful example of this phase in Toni Morrison’s work The Bluest Eye. 
There, the narrator in the novel, a nine-year-old girl named Claudia, highlights how abstract 
symbols work as conceptualizations during perception. With this illustration, we come into 
contact with the objectification of unintended consequences through Claudia’s experience.  It 
reads: 
Frieda and I are washing Mason jars.  We do not hear their words, but with 
grown-ups we listen to and watch out for their voices. . . . The edge, the curl, the 
thrust of their emotions is always clear to me and Frieda. We do not, cannot, 
know the meanings of all their words, for we are nine and ten years old.  So we 
watch their faces, their hands, their feet, and listen for truth in timbre. 
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Needless to say, the dialectical method is a particular way of viewing the world.  And Claudia 
appears to have discovered a least one of its principles, which is the relation between how adult 
expressions and posturing are pitted against her own. Here, Morrison’s example demonstrates 
how the unintended consequences of gestures and tones can generate distorted realities during an 
initial stage of experience.  From the sound of the adult’s inharmonic temperament and 
behavioral habits, to Claudia and her sister’s understood meaning of those sounds and gestures, 
back to the adult’s own perspectives, lies a double contrast and, an analogical standpoint of two 
different contrasts.  My goal is to help adequately situate what may already appear to the reader 
as integrated, or that which has not already unwittingly been discounted or presupposed as “not 
given.”  In other words, it has been taken-for-granted.  Although Sue’s Model, for reasons to be 
explored later, is much better than good, I interrogate his phase “Perception” in order to 
demonstrate how we may better understand the growth of experiencing occasions and the 
accretion of value as they apply to our feelings (i.e., like in Du Bois and Claudia’s case), as 
initial physical feelings that evade our acts of judging.  As a thesis project, we look at how the 
world of data during this “outside-in” and “inside-out” process of the collection of can generate 
virtual realities.  In other words, the subject-predicate contrast is a fundamental sense of division 
that finds its way into subjectivity. 
During the growth of our experiencing occasions, we operate by an “outside-in⎯inside-
out” cognitive process.  This process deals with not only a notion of generic contrast, but 
moreover, it is applicable to the actual and potential world.  The process can be best described in 
relation to “outside-in” as “whole to parts,” and “inside-out” as “parts to whole.”  Respectively, 
it is an “input-output” phenomenon.  Given this, I will spend considerable time developing a 
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theory of ingression to help better explain how perception can sometimes work. Ingression is 
“the functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of another actual entity” (Whitehead, 
1978:23). Thus, it is a particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in 
a particular actual entity […] (Ibid., p. 23). What I mean to suggest here is that the feelings 
involved during the actual occasion of an individual’s ultimate purpose, is an aim that gains 
satisfaction in a particular mode of ingression. This particular mode of ingression, as discussed 
here in this paper, is a perspective by which the subject prehends. I find it important to mention 
here, that, by no means am I (nor would I) advocate for such a perspective. Perspectivals have 
limits. Yet, it is moreover a standpoint.  And because it is a standpoint, it is of the essence to 
assist in its virtual integration. 
This is not to say that phases three, four, and five, i.e., “Reaction,” “Interpretation,” and 
“Consequence,” respectively, are irrelevant, or insignificant.  Rather, my goal is simply to show 
how a sensation functions as a proposition, or lure for feeling” (Ibid., p. 184)  The feeling felt, I 
argue, meets its categoreal demands of microaggression as the objective datum arises from the 
past like a haunting. In other words, it is a potential reaction. Although the “incident phase” 
constitutes a “situation experienced,” it also contains an “object intervened” during the 
microaggression process given its history.  
Sue does provide us various ways of looking at the situation experienced through group-
specific microaggressions. He also explores these categories as they operate in the areas of 
education, employment, medicine, law, housing, etc.  My claim, however, is that he does not 
adequately explain an “inside-out” method of looking at the same event through his 
microaggressions forms.  
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In Sue’s taxonomy, he provides readers with three ways to classify microaggressions.  
The forms include: microassaults, microinsults, and microinvalidations. Given this, I argue that 
the Model does not provide an adequate perspective for the individual experiencing the 
microaggression. How can an individual develop this capacity?   
Each of Sue’s forms is like its own camera lens, or “microaggressive form” which allows 
for limited levels of analysis and interpretation.  The problem is that each form has its own 
intensity for detection or perception, with microinvalidation being the subtlest; and therefore, the 
most abstract and potentially harmful.  In fact, giving an analysis at this level depicts instances 
sometimes as “illusory,” “haunting,” and “virtual.” Therefore, the “perception” phase becomes 
the main concern of this thesis project because (1) microinvalidations are subtle, (2) a part of 
perception, and (3) understudied, and more importantly (4) an especially interesting and 
meaningful cite of investigation for exploration of microaggressions. 
In order to understand the ghostly and enigmatic nature of microaggressions, we can use 
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois’s (1868-1963) concept of double consciousness.  The theory 
of double consciousness describes nearly identical circumstances of microaggressions’ 
“contentious,” “ghostly,” “illusory,” and “haunting” nature.  Here, I adopt the theory to help 
highlight the hidden and unconscious factors of an “outside-in”/ “inside-out” transmission of 
experience.  In the course of this discussion, I demonstrate how transition from the incident 
phase to the perception phase is sociologically important but poorly understood. What I mean 
here is that the feeling felt during the incident phase of a microaggression is largely neglected in 
the literature but is vital to an understanding of microaggressions.  Because each particular 
microaggression that Sue describes in his taxonomy is complex and distinct in its intensities, it 
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follows that each occasion is not only novel to that specific occasion, but specific to each 
microaggressive form.  My claim is that given the intensity of a microaggressive felt, we can 
expect to see variations in interpretations in relation to its various forms.  My study seeks to 
explore this issue empirically by the following speculative-methodological stance.  I begin by 
giving an exposition of Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness and an articulation of Sue’s 
theory of microaggressive forms.  Using a theory of perception, I show how one is actualized in 
the other.  Additionally, I have provided several popular culture examples. In particular, I have 
chosen the recent depictions of LeBron James and Mario Balotelli as King Kong as my central 
focus to have some support for the view which I am refuting in my conclusion.  In the following 
section, six empirical cases are provided as examples of microaggressive forms as theorized by 
Sue.  Here, we are introduced to an irreducible perspective of generic contrasts in Sue’s theory.  
In the concluding sections, I demonstrate how the general dispositions of Sue’s microaggressive 
forms and intensities can generate a transmutable concept of Du Boisian double consciousness 
that needs to be refuted. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY OF DU BOISIAN DOUBLE COUNSCIOUSNESS  
 
 The theory of double consciousness, perhaps W. E. B. Du Bois’s most well known 
theoretical contribution, contains an astounding number of insights into the experience of race 
and racial identity. As Cornel West describes it, double consciousness is “the dialectic of black 
self-recognition [oscillating] between being in America but not of it, from being black natives to 
black aliens” (West, 1999: 58). But this is not all.  The theory has other subtle, seemingly 
nonexistent hindrances that operate more subtly.  While Du Bois does not explicitly elaborate 
this point, implications of this claim can be seen throughout his oeuvre. In “Of Our Spiritual 
Strivings,” the opening chapter of The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Du Bois gives us a succinct 
idea of his experience. 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by 
some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly 
framing it.  They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or 
compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a 
problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town, or, I fought at 
Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil?  At 
these I smile, or am interested, or reduced the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion 
may require.  To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer 
seldom a word. 
 
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has 
never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood. . . . (Du Bois, 2003: 7). 
 
It is precisely this residue of similar but subtle, enigmatic message forms that continue to 
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characterize many African American experiences today. A fundamental component of Du Bois’s 
theory of double consciousness is that African Americans experience the world quite differently 
from European Americans. Notice that Du Bois shifts the “framing” of the original utterances of 
white folks’ speech acts in order to get at what he refers to as “the real question,” which is “How 
does it feel to be a problem?”  By finessing the framing, Du Bois highlights a very important 
aspect of semantic pragmatics, which is: valuation and the distinction between race-based 
interpretive differences.  
Central to Du Bois’s query is the concept of white folks’ frame of reference. This points 
towards how things had to have been situated not only behaviorally, but cognitively.  Utterances 
during slavery and the Jim and Jane Crow era were simply communicative apparatuses that white 
folks used as directives for their hierarchical worldview.  To comply with white authority was 
not only expected, but was registered as the verbal (speech) or nonverbal (thought) norm.  
Message forms no doubt must have played out in an etiquette that divided ideals into “normal” 
versus “deviant,” or “active” and “passive” ideological frameworks.  Given this, the former 
conceptual framework imposes a sense of aesthetic valuation and normativity on the latter 
alternative conceptual framework. Needless to say, scholars who used white theory and practice 
had the racial privilege to neglect, dismiss, ignore, and eclipse other alternative conceptual 
frameworks. This not only proves to be psychologically advantageous to white folk per se, but it 
is disadvantageous to cultural harmony.   
In considering the ways that double consciousness develops in general, oppression 
appears to be a least one ingredient. Such a concentration on only the self-interest and epistemic 
grid of a few comes at the sacrifice of wider interests and the broader cultural good. As Charles 
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Mills puts it in Blackness Visible, “[a] relationship to the world that is founded on racial privilege 
becomes simply the relationship to the world” (Mills, 1998: 10). This imagery helped establish 
white theory as an epistemology of normativity. For blacks, any deviation from white directives 
has been in the past viewed as insubordinate and the grounds for incarceration, torture, or death.  
Needless to say, this helped spread radically different worldviews between whites and blacks.  
Du Bois repeatedly alluded to this fact when referring to black American experiences: “one ever 
feels, his two-ness . . . [his existential predicament] two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body . . .” (Souls, p. 9). We are all too familiar with the 
crippling effects of this dark past, and sadly, this fracturing condition may be more common 
across races than ever before. Robert Gooding-Williams is helpful in highlighting this idea in his 
recent work In the Shadow of Du Bois (2009) where he writes: 
Judgments and strivings predicated on American ideals will conflict with 
judgments and strivings predicated on Negro ideals, for where the latter 
judgments and strivings pertain to an accurate picture of Negro life, the former 
pertain to an inaccurate picture that derives from double consciousness. Except 
for the condition of double consciousness, American ideals would not “war” with 
Negro ideals, because except for the condition of double consciousness, American 
ideals and Negro ideals would not give rise to conflicting judgments and strivings. 
 
[. . .] double consciousness is a causally necessary condition of conflictual two-
ness, for the condition of double consciousness is required to engender a conflict 
between American and Negro judgments and strivings (emphasis added; 2009: 
82). 
 
Beyond strivings, though, there is a conflict between black and white perspectives. Like any 
oppressed group or individual, African American’s experience of microaggressions cluster 
around tropes and metaphors of invisibility, namelessness, and powerlessness. Those who are not 
oppressed (i.e., whites, or those who can be said to “occupy personhood,”) either (1) recognize 
the circumstances of the oppressed and choose to ignore it, (2) are completely unaware of the 
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circumstances, or (3) are aware of the circumstances but unsure when they actually take place or 
what to do about them.  One cannot help but to think of whites’ “social alexithymia,” which is, 
“the inability of a great many whites to understand where African Americans and other people of 
color are coming from and what their racialized experiences are like” (Feagin, 2010: 89).  As Joe 
Feagin points out, “[it] involves a significant lack of cross-racial empathy” (Ibid).  Both black 
and white presuppose whites’ underlying sense of privilege.  For the oppressed, the 
circumstances themselves pose a complexity of problem simply because of its conflictual nature.  
For example: Not only are African Americans forced to think about how they might be viewed in 
the eyes of others like most Americans do after a sense of “a self” has been constructed, but they 
exhaustively think about how the event of blackness might be perceived by others as well. Sadly, 
then, the idea of double consciousness has become black people’s problems, which has emerged 
into an array of American societal problems. Classical writers like Ralph Ellison (1914-1994) in 
his book Invisible Man, James Baldwin’s (1924-1987) Giovanni’s Room, and Frantz Fanon’s 
revolutionary work (1925-1961) Black Skin, White Masks have all pointed out in their own 
personal ways how they have been simultaneously influenced by and opposed to white 
Americanism.  In the opening passage of Invisible Man, Ellison gives a description of this 
experience. 
I am an invisible man.  No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan 
Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms.  I am a man of 
substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to 
possess a mind.  I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see 
me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though 
I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach 
me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-
in-deed, everything and anything except me (p. 3). 
 
As we can see, the experiential weight of white supremacist imposition creates what Du Bois 
 
12 
might call, “a peculiar sensation” in Ellison. Denied the sublimity of Immanuel Kant’s idea of 
“occupying personhood” or the normative status for participation on the stage of life, Ellison is 
practically nonexistent. His experience, a racialized consciousness, speaks to a collective black 
experience, “a monolithic conglomerate,” as West has once said it.   
What Ellison reveals here is significant.  Notice that in his language usage he signifies an 
ocular metaphor⎯mirrors of a hard, distorting glass⎯that serves as a referential lens to reality 
while being-in-the-world. His linguistic considerations provide a perspective that points out a 
major interpretive difference when we compare and contrast it to Rene Descartes’s [cogito sum.]   
Following the seventeenth century French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), the modern 
European world was turned from a stage of skepticism and thrust into a world of certainty with 
his famous utterance, “Cogito ergo sum.”  With this, he greatly influenced the way people came 
to see and interpret reality.  His conception of cogito sum simultaneously defined and ultimately 
“transformed the subjectivity of doubt to certainty […] in an attempt to provide a theoretical 
basis for the legitimacy of modern science” (West, 1999: 74), but more importantly, he inverted 
the idea between “thinking” and the “thinking ‘of being’.”  
Without considering the ways in which the non-Cartesian sum (hereafter, Ellisonian sum) 
develops and operates in the oppressed, African Americans find themselves forced to interact 
with reality, under a symbolic structure that reinforces and promotes psychological advantages to 
whites.  The impact of this unknown separation and preferential value of a worldview is what Du 
Bois attempted to hash out through his central metaphor of “the Veil.”   He writes:  
The worlds within and without the Veil of Color are changing and changing 
rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must produce a 
peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and bewilderment.  Such 
a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes, must 
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give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to pretence or to 
revolt, to hypocrisy or to radicalism. (Du Bois, 2003: 143). 
 
These changing realities have become familiar enough to African American’s lifeworld 
experiences to be considered fundamentally established and naturalized. Grappling with their 
sense of “double life […] double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes,” African 
Americans are seduced by an ontological framing that creates dipolarized ideological empires. 
As such, perspectives and the gamut of ideas are divided into two psychic spheres, two 
theoretical moral worldviews, one white and one black.   
Independent scholar Cynthia Schrager, in her essay “Both Sides of the Veil: Race, 
Science, and Mysticism in W. E. B. Du Bois,” has pointed out these “two conflicting currents” 
which Du Bois addresses.  There she claims that the two domains are like a contest—“an internal 
debate within the black community [...] as it were, between the so-called ‘soulless materialism’ 
espoused by Washington . . . and what we might call the ‘spiritual strivings’ [advocated by] Du 
Bois” (Schrager, 552). Schrager suggests that Du Bois’s narrative focused more on the power of 
knowledge and on the inwardly touched character of American Negroes while Washington’s 
centered more on the culmination of wealth through self-help initiatives. Du Bois and 
Washington, both seduced in their own particular ways by the “elitism of an Enlightenment 
ethos,” undoubtedly had their flaws.  Du Bois’s major shortcoming, I believe, was his naïveté of 
the intrinsic motivations of white supremacy, while Washington’s civic compromise and 
unwitting submission into white capitalistic society proved to be premature, if not just all out 
short-sighted.  The social divide as far as Schrager could see was simply a reproduction of “the 
border dispute being waged in late-nineteenth-century western culture between science and 
religion . . . “ (Ibid.). Following the lead of American pragmatist pioneer, William James, she 
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characterized the split as an antipathy between the “scientific-academic” and the “feminine-
mystical” minds (emphasis added; Ibid.).  As we shall see below, this idea fits well with 
Gooding-Williams’s “conflictual two-ness” theoretical analysis of the concept of double 
consciousness.  
I find it important to note here, however, that although Du Bois did not agree with 
Washington’s self-help agenda, it was not a complete dismissal of Washington’s aim as much as 
it was his strategy.  Du Bois knew that self-help efforts were not able to deal with the political 
power of white elites.  For these reasons, Du Bois was not only firm on the energies of self-
assertion (like Washington), but he aimed at a way of empowering African Americans with a 
weapon of self-development and self-government, which would prophetically emphasize a 
theory of mind from the “inside-out” of its subjective form, rather than strictly an “outside-in” 
and physical one.  Washington’s strategy is simply a physicalism that blinks at rights advocacy. 
It takes the predicament to be strictly a logical matter from the outside concrete world. This is 
precisely why it is a notion of the double consciousness. 
The rights and ideas of African American liberties were in the hands of the white elite.  
Washington’s failure to see or hold secure the significance of those intrinsic qualities that Du 
Bois held as fundamental for a “truer self-consciousness,” proved instead to be a loose end in his 
thought and project. With this, it is commonly argued that Washington uncritically accepts, if not 
all out endorses a white frame of reference for African Americans.  His preoccupation with 
oneness, i.e., the “outside-in”, ignores African Americans’ larger predicament of dealing with the 
Cartesian cogito sum which is from the “inside-out.”  Given this, Washington’s plan regrettably 
falls right into the hands of white separatist practices by overlooking this smaller detail. Failing 
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to realize that self-help initiatives would be seconded under Jim and Jane Crowism, Washington 
inadvertently was asking black people to leave their future possibilities in the hands of non-
morally persuaded white elites. Today, the way that these discriminatory factors work during 
intellectual activity has proved to be frighteningly similar.  In the following section, we explore 
the theory of microaggressions and I explain how. 
 
MICROAGGRESSIONS 
Microaggressions, as described by Sue… 
[c]an be overt or covert but they are most damaging when they occur outside the 
level of the conscious awareness of well-intentioned perpetrators.  Most of us can 
recognize and define overt forms of bias and discrimination and will actively 
condemn such actions.  However, the “invisible” manifestations are not under 
conscious awareness and control, so they occur spontaneously without checks and 
balances in personal, social, and work-related interactions.  They can occur 
among and between family members, neighbors and coworkers, and in student-
teacher, healthcare provider-patient, therapist-client, and employer-employee 
relationships.  They are numerous, continuous, and have a detrimental impact 
upon targets. Being able to define microaggressions and to know the various 
forms they take must begin with a cognitive and intellectual understanding of 
their manifestations and impact (emphasis added; 2010: 40). 
 
The term “microaggressions” was first coined by Chester M. Pierce and colleagues in his work 
on racism during the 1970s as the “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges 
which are ‘put downs’ of blacks by offenders” (as cited by Sue).  In the decades following 
Pierce’s research, there was very little attention given to the study of microaggressions and its 
effects. However, works like Derald Wing Sue’s taxonomy in Microaggressions in Everyday 
Life (2010), and concepts like “de cardio” racism, a term coined by John L. Jackson, Jr. in Racial 
Paranoia (2008) have recently emerged. Consider two popular culture examples to help illustrate 
this point.  
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Twenty-two year old soccer superstar, Mario Balotelli is no stranger to racial 
microaggressions.  Neither is the American professional basketball player LeBron James.  Both 
athletes have recently been linked to and depicted as the image of King Kong within this recent 
year.  According to National Public Radio (hereafter, NPR) correspondent Sylvia Poggioli, 
“Balotelli has faced numerous flashpoints of racist abuse both on and off the playing field” (NPR 
Producer, 2012), since he gained national recognition with Manchester City and the Italy 
national team. Only days before Italy’s victory over Germany in the Euro 2012 soccer 
tournament held in Warsaw, soccer fans in Turin were chanting, “There's no such thing as a 
black Italian” (Ibid). Some fans even greeted him by “throwing bananas and making monkey 
imitations” (Ibid).  As if that was not enough, La Gazzetta dello Sport, reports Poggioli, a 
renowned Italian sports daily newspaper, insensitively published “a cartoon depicting Balotelli as 
King Kong swatting soccer balls on top of Italy’s Clock Tower Big Ben” (Ibid). LeBron James 
has had similar stirrings. On the April issue of Vogue 2008 magazine, the 6-foot-8 NBA 
superstar is seen “baring his teeth, with one hand dribbling a ball and the other around 5-foot-11 
Brazilian model Gisele Bundchen” (USA Today, 2008). According a columnist in the USA 
Today it is an image that some magazine analyst have “likened to King Kong and Fay Wray” 
(Ibid). There are a number places we can begin interpreting these happenings.  I shall like to 
begin with Balotelli and the racially inflammatory chant, ‘There’s no such thing as a black 
Italian’  
 
MICROASSAULTS, MICROINSULTS, MICROINVALIDATIONS 
The utterance, ‘There’s no such thing as a black Italian’ perfectly describes what Sue 
calls a microassault (2010). They are one of the three major forms of microaggressions presented 
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in his theory. The other two are microinsults and microinvalidations. As Sue defines it, 
microassaults are “the conscious, deliberate, and either subtle or explicit racial, gender, or 
sexual-orientation biased attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that are communicated to marginalized 
groups through environmental cues, verbalizations, or behaviors” (2010:28). They can be best 
understood as blatant, open and voluntary discriminatory acts or verbal abuse like we see in 
Balotelli’s incident.  
However, as we have mentioned, microaggressions are not always open or verbal.  John 
L. Jackson, Jr. was undoubtedly aware of this fact because in his work Racial Paranoia (2008) 
he attempts to articulate and transform the previous cultural intensity, i.e., Jim and Jane Crow 
race-based data of perception, and transcend it beyond blatant, specifiable forms. This is the idea 
that Jackson has in mind where he writes: 
We are being naïve if we think that we can sit down and intellectualize ourselves 
out of its sticky clutches, if we imagine that ending explicit commitments to 
blatant types of racial discrimination must mean that we are done with racism’s 
awful legacy for good.  It is a trap that scholars fall into as well, assuming that all 
they have to do is objectively “deconstruct” race, prove it isn’t real in the 
biological ways we once thought, and then imagine that by doing so they have 
somehow inoculated us all against its most hazardous features, dulled its sharpest 
talons.  That isn’t nearly true (p. 84). 
 
Here, Jackson points out that we cannot deconstruct race or remove explicit forms of racism and 
think we are getting out of racism.  In doing so, he alludes to the “ghostly character” of racism.  
Thus, it follows that it is more difficult today to spot racial microaggressions because it is not 
“old-fashioned” racism like we would see during the Jim and Jane Crow era.  Jackson’s concept 
of “de cardio” racism is racism that people of color attribute to white people’s hearts because it 
cannot be directly picked out in what people are saying or doing because they are all politically 
correct.  In short, to be racist is no longer openly accepted because white people know that it is 
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frowned upon. 
One of the major shortcomings in Jackson’s theory, however, is although the ability to 
have qualitative perceptions is necessary to individual well-being and survival, it may not be 
sufficient to describe the nature of microaggressions in other potential and actual occasions. 
What I mean to point out here is that while Jackson helps us with understanding the subtleties of 
a race-based data through his concept of “de cardio” racism, if taken in isolation (as a standpoint, 
and thereby postulating a whole), the theory simply takes on a fallible description which ignores 
other marginalizing epiphenomena despite their actual occasions.  This is certainly not to say that 
what Balotelli felt is not a racial microaggression. Many would rightfully argue that it was flat-
out racist.  My claim is that while people should be able to perceive microaggressions where 
there is an explicit occurrence, they should not only be able to point out other less-explicit types 
of occasions too, but more importantly (for reasons to be discussed later), not to unconsciously 
transfer the proposition to other demographics.  Otherwise, this in turn is also a microaggressive 
reality.  Microaggression as discussed here begins to take on a virtual and more illusory 
character.  Sue does not categorize microaggressions under these terms.  However, in Section IV 
of his work Microaggressions, entitled “Microaggressions in Employment, Education, and 
Mental Health Practice” he does discuss and show the impact that the accretion of these 
microaggressions have (2010: 209-280).   
The way that we shall think about the term ‘impact’ here works best if thought of as in a 
theory of intensity.  Intensity, as described by Alfred N. Whitehead, “is the origination of a 
conceptual feeling by the subjective aim…” (1978: 27). Thus, the subjective intensity of the 
experience is also a conceptual feeling. It is best understood as a mode of perception with a 
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nexus of operations and functions.  Briefly, then, the subjective aim of the individual, in the 
moment of an actual occasion, is also causative agent from the perceived physical world.  
Therefore, when an individual achieves mastery of his or her environment through the signifying 
mode of consciousness (i.e., race-based consciousness, gender-based consciousness, etc.), a 
perception of its causative agencies is perceived as well.  The generic contrast between the two is 
based on a perceived history.  An example of the concept is useful here.  On May 09, 2012 
President Barack Obama became the first president to publicly endorse same-sex marriage.1 The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (hereafter, NAACP) went along 
with President Obama’s bold initiative, deeming it a relevant civil rights issue. However, some 
clergymen and local leaders broke away from the organization and began talking like the people 
who once oppressed them. One case in point, Reverend Keith Ratliff, Sr., a long time outspoken 
critic of same-sex marriage and president of the Iowa-Nebraska chapter resigned.  According to 
NPR analyst Cheryl Corley, Rev. Ratliff said that the “[d]eviant behavior [of homosexuals] is not 
the same as being denied your right to vote because of the color of one’s skin.”  In Ratliff’s own 
words, “Gay community: Stop hijacking the civil rights movement” (NPR Producer, 2012). 
What then is the difference between Rev. Ratliff’s analytical focus and the temperament which 
informs the operations of Washington’s self-help project?  Not very much I fear.  A nexus of 
intensities like Ratliff’s, however, is insulting to the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transsexual 
community (hereafter, LGBT community). This is exactly why it is a microinsult.   
As defined by Sue, microinsults are the “interpersonal or environmental communications 
                                                            
1Interestingly enough, President Barack Obama has been called the first “gay president” along 
with actually being the first president of African American-decent.  Yet ironically, former 
President William “Bill” Clinton was named the first “black president” although he is in fact of 
white heritage and decent. 
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that convey stereotypes, rudeness, and insensitivity that demean a person’s racial, gender, or 
sexual orientation, heritage, or identity” (2010:31).  The interesting thing about microinsults is 
that they typically “come with” or reveal other hidden themes, i.e., metacommunications. In an 
original microaggression taxonomy proposed by Sue and Capodilupo (2008), they included the 
following themes cited by (Sue, 2010: 32-39). 
Table 1 is a representation of Sue and Capodilupo (2008) proposed microaggression 
taxonomy. Here, included microinsults and microinvalidations show considerable overlapping.  
Where in some cases we are left with little doubt as to the intent of the microaggression (i.e., 
microassaults, which are conscious and deliberate), the dividing line between microinsults and 
microinvalidations usages generates confusion and fosters illusory realities.  As Sue points out, 
“microinsults and microinvalidations often come from a catch-22 created by double messages” 
(Sue 2010:88).  It is this microinsult-microinvalidation contrast which should not only help us 
better understand the transmutated complexity of a Du Boisian double consciousness, but also, in 
assisting us with the integration and synthesis of its conflictual two-ness.  
Sue’s theory, unlike Jackson’s, highlights other relational modes of thinking (i.e., de 
cardio sexism, de cardio classism, etc.).  In doing this, Sue is not preoccupied with a fixed 
disposition of assuring us of only racial microaggressions.  This helps us in remaining mindful of 
the interrelatedness of other epiphenomena potentially involved.  However, Sue’s project, too, 
has its shortcomings.  The mere idea of separating group-specific microaggressions into their 
own discriminatory parts, acting as wholes, simply demonstrates how we may unknowingly 
place an invisible wedge between interpretations and our “thought-to-be” viewpoints through 
theories of intersectionality (i.e., racial microaggressions, race-gender microaggressions, race-
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gender-age microaggressions).  The problem is that it does not adequately capture the subjective 
valuation of experience. It is more segmentally applied. As we saw in Rev. Ratliff’s case, he 
gives priority to race-based epiphenomena. While we can agree with Rev. Ratliff that Black 
Power Movements are clearly different in type than the Gay and Lesbian Movement—to remain 
culturally insensitive to the LGBT community’s struggles not only neglects the general 
consensus regarding how oppressive systems overlap and operate, it perpetuates social division. 
There is a knowable subtlety here, which, if overlooked, may have devastating outcomes. This is 
how microinvalidations work. Sue tells us that microinvalidations are characterized by 
“communications or environmental cues that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological 
thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of certain groups, such as people of color, women, and 
LGBTs” (Sue, 2010: 37). Here, in the valuation of the language-symbolization process, Ratliff 
demonstrates social division and ordering. This bias necessarily occurs when we make any 
pronouncement. However, to tell other marginalized groups, to ‘stop hijacking the civil rights 
movement’ clearly confuses a right for an expectation. Nothing is wrong with this, but less well 
understood is how the ideological empire of whiteness retains its status as a cultural identifier. 
Consider the following lexical items as a simpler illustration: “nigger” and “wigger.” Reportedly, 
“wigger” is the derogatory, white equivalent of a term for “nigger.”  Here it should become 
glaringly obvious that blackness is the primary qualification for being a “nigger.” Whiteness, on 
the other hand, retains a privileged ranking.  At best, there is only the “white nigger.”  Given this 
example we can admit to the intersections of microaggressions, like in Sue’s methods. Our 
general dispositions however lead us to believe that a concept of a process is a disagreement in 
terms. As a result, this can lead to confusion. In Sue’s Microaggression Process Model (2010) he 
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attempts to describe the (1) initial stages of a racial microaggression; (2) how they are perceived; 
(3) the recipient’s reactions; (4) how they are interpreted; and (5) their consequences (2010: 65-
86).  
In Sue’s (2010) Model (See also Table 2), we see the concept of a microaggression in its 
completeness, i.e., from beginning to end. It constitutes the immediacy of a microaggressive 
form. In other words, each of the five phases in their ‘togetherness’ establish the complex unity 
of an actual occasion.  It can be said, then, that the microaggressive process is the logical 
relations to that which is not yet felt.  It is a snap-shot picture which happens instantaneously 
with no involvement of conscious awareness.  
Phase one, the “incident phase,” is a situation, scenario or event experienced by the 
subject.  Phase two is “perception.” This domain deals with the subject’s belief as to whether or 
not the incident was racially infused or motivated.  Much of our focus is centered around this 
domain because, as even Sue maintains, “responses vary” (2010: 68).  In the next section, we 
shall take a look at some participant responses from an empirical study that was conducted. 
There we can see how and why responses sometimes vary among participants. Sue’s Model fails 
to demonstrate adequately, that, during phenomena of the “incident phase,” there is a felt 
microaggressive form which helps satisfy the interpretation of the remaining phases (i.e., 
reaction, interpretation, consequence).  For example, if the incident phase is a microassault, there 
should not be any questioning in the domain of perception.  If there is questioning as Sue has 
indicated in his description of the second phase, then, the perspective represents invalidating 
microaggressions (i.e., microinvalidations) if it is unconsciously taken-for-granted, or neglected. 
It is precisely this “inside-out” subjective function, in conjunction with Sue’s “outside-in” 
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method that is needed in order to help expand the theory.  As Sue points out, “one of the 
important core ideas of the perception phase is the process of ‘Questioning’ ” (2010: 72). With 
this we become conscious of an actual-potential contrast which effect the remaining phases in 
different ways.  This transfer of function, in the reaction phase, for instance, generates realities 
like “paranoia,” “sanity checks,” struggles for “self-recognition,” and “saving face” of the 
offenders (Sue, 2010: 73).  As we move into phase four and five, interpretations and 
consequences, of course, vary according to factors like: (1) personal experiences, (2) their 
relationship to the perpetrator, (3) the racial/cultural identity development of the recipient, and 
(4) the thematic content of the microaggression (Ibid.). What is accounted for in large part here 
in this paper is (4) because: the actual is the concrete, tangible and finite world of the incident 
itself.  This is also what in fact makes it physical and real.  The incident is potential, in that there 
is the free play on the imagination.  Therefore, it holds a conceptual and mental component as 
well. Cognitive and deliberative oscillation is an aspect of intellectual activity that many of us 
often take for granted.  It is what oftentimes generates propositions of misconception and error. 
When expressed in terms of its generic contrast during perception, it is best defined and 
understood as a theory of virtuality, oscillating in the flux of between a physical pole and a 
mental poles.  
Sue provides a serviceable light on the operation that I am referring to with an example 
from the 2008 presidential campaign (2010: 5-6).  Here he demonstrates how microaggressions, 
with the proper environment, can work as symbols.  
[...] Republican Senator John McCain appeared at a political rally taking 
questions from his supporters.  One elderly White woman, speaking into a 
handheld microphone, haltingly stated, “I don’t trust Obama.  He’s an Arab.” 
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McCain shook his head, quickly took the microphone, and said, “No ma’am.  
He’s a descent family man, a citizen that I just happen to have disagreements 
with.” 
 
Sue continues,  
At first glance, John McCain’s defense of the then-candidate Barack Obama 
appeared admirable. After all, he was correcting misinformation and defending a 
political rival. 
 
But upon deeper reflection, Sue concludes that, 
[...] his response [McCain], while well-intentioned, represented a major 
microaggression.   
 
What I am taking Sue to mean here by “major microaggression” is the potency of the 
microaggression in relation to the subtleness and intensity of other potential microaggression 
forms.  In this case, the microaggressive form is at a very high level of abstraction not because of 
its conceptual-value, but because of the level of generality it is grounded on in relation to other 
microaggressive criteria for detection. “Major microaggression” therefore means “at,” “in” or 
“of” the highest intensity of abstraction for which a microaggression can possibly be detected, 
which is its level of subtleness.  This appears to be a slippery slope because the “highest level,” 
as many might argue, is, perhaps, what is explicit, blatant and deliberate, i.e., microassaults.  But 
as we all know, language is biased, and then again, promiscuous.  Besides the brute fact of ‘the 
woman seeing something inherently bad or wrong with being an Arab,’ other underlying themes 
can remain hidden, and often do.  As Sue goes on to point out,  
Equating mistrust with a person’s nationality or religion, especially being Muslim 
or of Middle Eastern heritage, has resurged in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
 
What we have witnessed here are the categoreal demands and imagery of an ingression of the 
symbolic reference “terrorism” into the Middle Easterners and Muslim community at a 
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microlevel. It is extremely subtle, but it is precisely why it is a microinvalidation.  However, 
notice the triviality of the idea. The microaggression is also a microinsult because it is utterly 
insulting as well.  Thus, where historical events like 9/11 can work to produce preconceived 
meanings and fixed to dispositions with as much regularity in their complexity as to objectify 
present and future possibilities, (not only with those same concepts, but also similar conceptual 
feelings as the initial phase), these value-laden symbols then can be rightly identified as 
microinvalidations that not only “creep in” undetected as functional substitutes of the reality 
experienced; but they are fill-ins, mixed “hybrid feelings” (Whitehead, 1972), i.e., propositions, 
for the thought of those experiences as a “perspective of perspectives” as thought to be felt by 
the subject and by others.  In the concluding section, I discuss these propositions as they apply to 
a popular culture example involving Mario Balotelli and LeBron James. However, in this next 
section, we explore the responses and analysis of an empirical study conducted to help highlight 
some microaggressive forms when they actually occur.  Thus, the purpose aim for in this project 
is to answer the question of what is the capacity for the realization of a microaggression?  This 
question was answered by interviewing students throughout the insular South on their 
experiences with microaggressions.  Interviewee responses were coded and analyzed using Sue’s 
taxonomy of microaggressive forms. 
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CHAPTER III 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MICROAGGRESSION FORMS  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Ten people were asked to participate in an interview across southern campuses and 
communities. Of those who were approached for interviews, four expressed concerns about 
being voice recorded. The resulting six participants were included for analysis: Nicholas, a 21-
year-old African American male from Tennessee; Vaughn, a 22-year-old African American male 
who grew up in Mississippi; Ashley, a 23-year-old African American female who works at a 
local restaurant near a southern university; Kalvin, a 26-year-old African American male student; 
Ricci, a 25-year-old graduate student and library employee; and Victor, a 29-year-old African 
American male who works as an attorney in a local law firm.  
All participants included in the analysis consented to participating prior to starting the 
interview. Interviews occurred at convenient locations surrounding local universities, namely 
outside of libraries, student centers, lunchrooms, bus stops, etc.  All interviews were conducted 
during the day, and took no longer than 15 minutes to complete. Interviewees were selected 
using a convenience sample.  
Each interview followed a similar structure. Verbal consent was obtained prior to starting a 
voice recorder.  After starting the recorder, participants were asked the following questions: 
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1. Do you believe that racial discrimination is still going on today? If so, how? 
2. Have you had any personal experiences with racial discrimination? 
3. Do you recall any instances where you believed you were being discriminated against 
but you were not quite sure? If so, when or how? 
 
Each question was read to the interviewee one at a time for clarity and understanding. 
Interviewees were given ample time to answer each question before moving on to the next 
question.  The interviewer provided verbal cues (i.e., “how so”, “what do you mean by that?”) 
only to help provide clarity to the interviewee’s response.  
The interview concluded after participants had responded to all questions. They were 
thanked for their time before being debriefed and excused from the study.  Voice recordings 
were transcribed, then, excerpts were selected as examples for analysis and discussion. 
 
CRITERIA FOR DATA AND CODING PROCEDURE  
After all interviews took place, interviewee responses were categorized and analyzed 
across types of microaggressions: a) microassaults, b) microinsults, or c) microinvalidations. 
Responses were categorized as follows: 
Microassaults: blatant, with high intensity for detection  
Microassaults carry a high intensity of detection because they are typically purposeful, 
conscious and deliberate acts of discrimination against other marginalized groups. Interviewee 
responses were included in this category if when they fit he description of de jure racism seen in 
Jim and Jane Crow era. 
Microinsults: subtle, with a moderate intensity for detection   
Like microinvalidations, microinsults are also subtle.  However, microinsults are 
generally slants or slights directed towards the self-esteem, for example, the discriminatory-
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based language in “separate but equal” and “don’t ask, don’t tell” policies. Microinsults are more 
detectable than microinvalidations, but not as detectable as microassaults. Interviewee responses 
were included in this category based on the microaggression’s complexity to causing confusing 
or pause in the respondent. 
Microinvalidiations: very subtle, with an extremely low intensity for detection  
Although microinvalidations have a low intensity for detection, they potentially cause the 
most harm because oftentimes they are ignored or neglected.  This is, in fact, what constitutes it 
as a microinvalidation.  They directly dismiss, deny, or negatively prehend the events and reality. 
More destruction is possible here because of microinvalidations extremely subtle detection. It 
bespeak to an invisible and seemingly nonexistent, and ghostly character, like the Ellisonian sum 
(see introduction).  Interviewee responses were included in this category based off its theme and 
predilection for colorblindness. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Nicholas, a 21-year-old undergraduate retells a story of an incident in a public restroom 
at a local bar near a southern university:  
I was peeing in the bathroom and this dude came stumbling through the door, like 
sloppy drunk.  He saw me and said, “Oh, my bad,” cause it was kinda a small 
bathroom. It only had a toilet and a urinal. His boy came in right behind him and 
bumped into him [.] and he said [the friend], “What’s going on?” Then the other 
dude said, “Nothing [.] but a nigger is in here using the toilet.”  I got so mad… 
 
There is nothing very unconscious or subtle about this incident, which is precisely why Sue 
would categorizes it as a microassault.  It is a clear attack aimed at Nicholas’s race.  Nicholas, in 
stating that, “[he] got so mad,” indicates that he detected it as such.  What is of particular interest 
here though is the social bond that is broken as an effect. Given the comment, “[…] a nigger is in 
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here using the toilet,” the “drunk dude” makes a clear distinction between him and Nicholas.  
Because racial domination defines the relationship between Nicholas and the “drunk dude” in 
white and black terms (no pun intended), it is not hard to see how an accretion of value involving 
race-based phenomenology gains efficacy through common day-to-day aesthetics. Sue predicts 
this much in his outside-in style of methodology.  The style as a methodology however is 
excessively objective.  The logical entailment of this approach is to help us locate a cultural and 
epochal schism from the physical outside world.  As seen in Nicholas and the “drunk dude’s” 
case, it is in the form of a relic from the old Jim and Jane Crow era.  It represents the relationship 
and symbolism of master-slave dialect. Thus, not only is Nicholas immediately reduced to a 
brute and second-class citizen by this subtle form of racial inheritance, but he is sociohistorically 
posited into another space and time period.  If this idea is unwittingly neglected or not prehended 
as a real possibility to Nicholas, a microinvalidation arises because although the concept of 
different space-time traveling is knowable, it is oftentimes fallibly interpreted, rather than 
explicitly understood of as a real potential and actual entity of reality.  This in turn can generate a 
seconded reality, i.e., a transmutated sense of Du Boisian double consciousness. 
Vaughn, a 22-year-old undergraduate from Mississippi shares with us a similar 
experience he had one Sunday after a church service: 
We had just gotten back from church. I must have been about 9 or 10 [.] these 
white people where flying [read: speeding] by the house and I heard somebody 
say, [participant whispering] “You fucking niggers!”  I couldn’t really tell what 
exactly they said exactly, but I know they said “nigger” cause I asked my mom 
what it meant [.] and she asked me where I had heard it from. 
 
Here, we have another example of a microassault.  Aforementioned, racial microassaults are 
simply “old-fashion” forms of Jim and Jane Crow racism that can produce secondary realities.  
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Here, again, it is an attack on race, Vaughn’s race.  Although, it is not likely that Vaughn had 
thought himself in any definitive terms as a brute, a slave, or a second-class citizen given his 
tender age, he has been most certainly qualified as one by “the Other,” i.e., white people.  With 
this, Vaughn has been transformed into a “subhuman” species, and seconded by social 
convention and cultural practices, as Sue theorizes.  Yet, Vaughn is too young to understand that 
mentally he is able to remain free from such conventions, and that linguistic structures are merely 
compartmentalizations that can imprison him if they are unwittingly taken wholesale as some 
truth.  Sadly then, Vaughn, as with most children, has the dreadful misfortune and dilemma of 
negatively prehending microinvalidations, until some conversion-like experience helps in the 
transformation of his perceptual interpretation.  This is partly because, as children, we do not 
quickly discover the true essence and value of ourselves until the conflictual two-ness schism is 
eliminable from our thinking. This is a distinction between fact and form. Failing to intellectually 
grasp the limits of a race-based identity through as inside-out style methodology is a necessary 
feat unless the individual is to remain mentally assimilated to the physical world of form, as a 
“subhuman,” “a child” or “second-class citizen” by conventional sociohistorico-cultural 
practices. This “outside-in”-“inside-out,” is simply another generic contrast of a transmutated 
form of Du Boisian double consciousness.  As a form of rethinking, Vaughn must contact this 
inside-out perspective as a way to counter-balance the outside-in perspective.  Otherwise, there a 
virtuality begins to emerge around other conceptual possibilities.  
Ashley, a 23-year-old undergraduate retells her experience as a hostess in a restaurant: 
… when I was helping Tiffany [a co-worker and waitress] this one table was 
really rude to me.  They said they needed to-go boxes.  So I grabbed them some.  
But after I gave them the boxes, the kids were laughing every time I passed by the 
table.  I thought they were laughing at me so I went to the restroom to check to 
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see if I had anything on my face. I didn’t see anything so the next time I went by 
the table and the kids were laughing—I asked them [the family of four] if they 
needed anything else.  They [parents of the children] shook their heads but one of 
the kids said [while giggling], “Yea, my dad said could you box up the lemons, 
too.” They started laughing, but you could tell that the dad was embarrassed. I 
don’t think he was expecting his son to say that [.] I told him, I was offended and 
that I thought he was rude.  When I told Tiffany and she said she didn’t think they 
were racist [.] She knew them she said [.] they aren’t racist—they just come from 
money and think they’re better than everybody else. She saw it as a class thing.  
Me and Tiffany still cool but I don’t think that was just a class thing.  To me it 
was racist. 
 
For Ashley, it remains clear that she saw the incident as a “racist moment.”  In fact, she reports 
“feeling it” first, thinking that she was being “laughed at.” Sue misses this moment of 
microaggression “as feeling.” Many might suggest that Ashley might have thought the customer 
was racist because she is of African-descent and the customer is white.  These images can and 
frequently do contribute to such an extent.  Sue expresses this idea and concept explicitly in his 
work as aesthetic intensities from the physical world.  The doctrine in which I am interested in 
teasing out here is much subtler (like how Ashley’s perception is immediately relegated to 
simply “race talk”).  As Ashley points out, “Tiffany knew them” . . .  [and that Tiffany claims it 
was] “just a class thing.”  Of course it is possible to think one interpretation is more befitting to 
the scenario than the other, but to ignore interpretations is to be culturally insensitive to other’s 
lived realities while being-in-the-world. Ashley thinks the people are racist and that the people 
are laughing at her. This is predicated on her experience of them as rude. She may have been 
predisposed to expect that white customers are rude to her as a black server. Tiffany could have 
been apologizing for them because she knew them, she could have said it was class-based 
because it makes her and Ashley (both servers) equal, as if to say, they may have treated her like 
that, too. Here, Ashley is experiencing racial paranoia because she thinks it is about race, but she 
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can not know with empirical certainty, other than her gut feeling, i.e., “de cardio” racism, that 
they are being racist, just being rude in general (with no particular motivation), or being classist.  
Yet, where we witness Tiffany’s exclamation of their innocence of racism, we can also see how 
Ashley has experienced another, subtler microaggressive form.  If we emphasize the response 
“they aren’t racist,” Tiffany explicitly denies Ashley’s racial reality.  If Tiffany is not just simply 
“pathologizing Ashley’s cultural values and communication styles,” (Sue, 2010) Tiffany’s 
reluctance to fully acknowledge or see how Ashley’s experience is real, bespeaks a sense of 
racial colorblindness (Sue, 2010).  Although extremely subtle, Ashley has also experienced a 
microinvalidation (one which she may not have detected). With feeling insulted, Ashley is the 
direct target of a racial microinsult.  But we cannot know for sure that she detects the 
microinvalidation transmitted from Tiffany, her friend and coworker.  Ashley simply dismisses 
it, by saying “me and Tiffany still cool but I don’t think that was just a class thing.”  In this case, 
the microaggression is negatively prehended or nullified on pretenses of friendship and worker 
association. Here we can see that microaggressions most certainly go undetected, but they 
remain detectable. Given this, we see another illustration of a microinsult-microinvalidation 
contrast, specifically because Ashley detects one microaggression but dismisses the other.  This 
generic contrast that can not only generate a structure of conflictual two-ness whose general 
principle perpetuates a distorted reality during the inflow of datum between physical and mental 
poles, but it can most certainly perpetuates a transmutated sense of Du Boisian double 
consciousness as well, i.e., a distorted reality.  
 Kalvin, a 26-year-old graduate student had a similar experience to Ashley.  Below, 
Kalvin explains how when he was at home with his roommates one evening while watching the 
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Summer Olympics, the following happened: 
Yea, this one time when me and my roommates were watching the Olympics. The 
women were getting ready to race and Steven asked me and Michael, “What 
country are the colors green, black, and yellow?”  I said “I don’t know, but maybe 
Jamaica.”  There was a pause.  Then Michael said, “But she’s white!”  I was 
confused for a second.  But I kinda started to smile to myself, because I never 
really thought of Michael as racist.  So I yelled back, so what are you saying, 
“That there are only black people in Jamaica?”  We all ended up laughing about it 
(emphasis added). 
 
This example fits particular well with Sue’s category of microinsults because it contains an 
unconscious message of “abnormality” and a theme of “second class citizenry.” The comment, 
“but she’s white” is an utterance that Kalvin found perplexingly insulting.  He did not know 
whether to he should feel insulted or not.  Michael’s assumption that the woman was not from 
Jamaica because she was “white” contains a metamessage that left Kalvin dazed and confused, 
but aware of the microaggression in general but not necessarily in terms of any definitive 
intensity. This confusion undoubtedly is generated by a disruption, or something conflitual in 
Kalvin’s way of thinking that reflects a division, and an oscillation between reality and non-
reality.  There would be no reason for anyone to doubt the existence of “white Africans” too 
under Michael’s logic.  For Michael, then, the idea of blackness is an event that is situated in 
Jamaica. Sue most certainly would agree with this much because the conflation of Michael’s 
functional logic is something that he discovered from his own experiences in culture, i.e., the 
physical world (which is an outside-in style of methodology).  But if the transitive character of 
Michael’s immediate deduction is adequately preserved as a worldview, i.e., white racial frame 
(as an inside-out rather in tandem with an outside-in style)⎯what ideas, events or concepts might 
have found their location in terms like “American,” “Iranian,” or “African?”  Given this, a subtle 
ingression of a vaguely postulated unit of logical measure constitutes a microaggressive reality 
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that Sue’s theoretical orientation dimly captures, which is precisely why it is a microinvalidation.  
We cannot safely conclude that Kalvin readily detects how the white racial frame has shaped his 
own logic.  Although Kalvin experiences a microaggressive reality, the trigger by which he 
receives the feeling dictates the intensity and the potential destructiveness of its form.  For 
instance, on the one hand, there is a connection between what Michael said and what Kalvin felt. 
On the other hand, there is the disharmony between what was said and how it made Kalvin feel.  
This is a significant point to remember because it highlights a distinction between what is 
cultural fact in one case and subjective form in another. With this, we inevitably contact an 
aesthetic/moral contrast.  This is a point that I shall return to in the concluding section. 
Ricci, a 25-year-old graduate student and librarian employee had this to say about one of 
her experiences with racial discrimination. 
We were in line talking, and this, there was this older white lady maybe 40 early 
50s.  She walks up in front of us [.] she walks up and she doesn’t look at us 
directly, but I know she can see us [.] and she gets in front of us, stops for a few 
seconds and her other friend comes up and they started having a conversation. I’m 
checking this out while I’m talking to my friend, and my friend didn’t even pay it 
any mind.  Then the lady continued to talk.  Well, as I saw the line move I tried 
stepping around her, without bumping her and we ended up almost hitting each 
other.  She looks at me and says “No, no what are you doing!”   I said: “Hey, we 
were in line before you.”  She looks over at her friend, I guess for some type of 
support.  Her friend look back at her and I said we were here a least 2 maybe 3 
minutes before you.  They think just because we’re African Americans that we 
still got to put up with that shit.  I said to my friend, “did you see that?” She said, 
“Yea, but I wouldn’t have said anything, I would have just let them pass.” 
 
African Americans have often described their experience of invisibility as being “ignored,” 
“devalued,” “insignificant,” “less than” or “unworthy of being recognized” (Sue, 2010).  
According to Sue’s account, this is a clear ascription to microinsults because of its concomitant 
theme of “second-class citizenry.”  But this is not all.  Being treated as a second-class citizen can 
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also evoke feelings of “alienation” and “objectification.” Given this, it is a microinvalidation that 
may or may not be detected or felt.  What is also of interest here is Ricci’s girlfriend’s response.  
Although, Ricci initially thought her friend “didn’t [see the woman],” we find out later in the 
passage that, admittedly, she did and ignored it.  Ricci’s reaction can also be interpreted as a 
“racial paranoia” rather than simply a healthy skepticism or suspicion; and her friend’s reaction, 
as a form of compliance or an “Aunt Jane” rather than something that was simply dismissed as 
insignificant. Given this, it can be rightly said that race has no meaning apart from its aesthetic 
and subjective intensity. 
Victor, a 29-year-old attorney, with whom I spoke with outside of a southern university 
library, retells the following story. 
I got up one morning around nine o’clock—nine thirty on Saturday morning to 
run when I realized I had left my sneakers at my parent’s house that was miles 
away.  Instead of going there to get them, I decided to drive to Hibbett’s to get a 
new pair.  When I got there, I park in front of another car in the parking lot. When 
I looked up to my left, I saw a lady in a car just diagonal to me.  She was on her 
cell phone.  When I got out of the car, I locked my door—and when I was 
walking past the lady in the car, I saw her frantically begin to tussle around for 
something near her car door window—when I then heard her car door lock.  Then 
I realized that she had locked her doors because she saw me coming.  I just 
laughed and kept walking—because stuff like that doesn’t even surprise me 
anymore. 
 
Victor’s experience highlights something very interesting about the workings of the 
microaggressions and the Cartesian sum.  When Victor got out of his car to go into the shoe 
store, the woman who saw him was invoked with panic, and as a result, “she locked her doors.”  
One way to look at the lady’s actions after seeing Victor are through values that could best be 
explained and attributed to gender-based ideologies, in terms of the stereotypes and taboos 
surrounding black sexuality.  Maybe she felt as if she was vulnerable to being raped, or robbed. 
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This point is undoubtedly hard to tease out, but there is something interesting here about the 
intersections of race, gender, and age. Would she have locked her doors for an older, better-
dressed black man? Or would she have done so as frantically? We cannot claim to know.  I do 
not see how anyone truly could.  This example fits well into the category of a microinsult 
because of its themes of “criminality” and “sexual objectification” (Sue, 2010: 36).  But it fits 
into Sue’s category of microinvalidation too because,⎯where we see intersections of race, 
gender, and age⎯we oftentimes neglect that we make assumptions on some achieved change in 
the accretion of value in each of the group-specified microaggressions for our acting judgment 
(See Ratliff, p. 19-21). Victor has clearly detected it as such, because, as he states in his response 
above, “I just laughed and kept walking… stuff like that doesn’t even surprise me anymore.”  
Where we see “stuff like” white people’s behavior as “no surprise” (to quote Victor), we also 
bear witness to the dimissal of a feeling and intensity.  Sue does make this point explicit in his 
theory.  I find it important to say that this is certainly not to say that Sue’s scholarship is not 
significant, or that his contributions are not widely appreciated.  This is largely not the case. Yet, 
it remains clear that Victor is well aware of the countless number of times in which 
microaggressions actually occur in his life.  With this, Victor (even if only momentarily), decides 
to ignore or neglect the ensuing conceptual feeling of unity with the intensity felt.  This is an 
important point to remember because although there can be no elimination of the conceptual 
feeling in general, Victor can cognitively manage the relative significance of its form.  And, of 
course this ignores all of the contextual ingredients of the outside world.   
An accumulation of microinvalidations is an integral determining factor of the 
intensiveness and impact of a microaggressive form. The “valuing up” or “valuing down” of his 
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feelings in an actual occasion is also causally linked to the objects of these feelings, i.e., white 
people’s behavior. Otherwise, there is no microaggressive form to be found.  But as we have 
earlier concluded, it is not a question of detecting the microaggression, but one of intensity.  But 
yet, when dealing with the intensities of microaggressive forms like microinsults and 
microinvalidations, it not only becomes difficult to epistemologically categorize the nature of 
their character (as Sue has attempted), but it is equally important to remember that the character 
is subjectively ascribed by a personal order. With the emergence of a microinsult-
microinvalidation contrast arises a division between subjective feelings.  Sue attempts to clear 
away some of the confusion through his conceptualization of microaggressive themes.  However, 
as demonstrated in the vignettes above, even those themes have been shown to overlap into more 
than one microaggressive form and feeling, as undetected, but certainly not undetectable.  Here, 
in Victor’s case, we see the adverb of his experience, for he decides to deal with “stuff like” the 
relentless continuation of white people’s behavior as something “unsurprising,” but knowable. 
This is undoubtedly is a form of resistance. With this, he has privately, if not consciously 
minimized the level of adjectival frequency with which the intensities are conflictually 
contrasted. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
  Of the many minorities who may adopt American values, their experiences, with 
overwhelming regularity, evoke and implicitly validate both a racial and sexist contract, which 
relegates their cultural distinctiveness as meaningless and undesirable.  Indeed, it is true that Du 
Bois often contrasted the dipolarized ideological frames through his central metaphor of “the 
Veil.”  However, despite this criticism, Du Bois ultimately sought to resolve the “warring ideals” 
between the two sterner logics.  Any naysayers refuting this end are unquestionably doing a 
gross misreading of his oeuvre and a misrepresentation of what he really meant.  This, too, can 
be a microinvalidation because many individuals often neglect, overlook or unwittingly dismiss 
the “predominance of the Enlightenment ethos” which largely influenced thinking in general 
during that time.  For example, if we look through a yearbook, we can generally make accurate 
judgments on what time periods particular images were intensified (e.g., the 1960s, 1970s, etc.) 
contingent upon the clothes people are wearing, hairstyles, eyewear, and through relevant 
imaging in the backgrounds.  During the time of the photo however, these realties and its 
concomitant of influences were considerably less evident to us, and to the people in them, 
although the ideas themselves were omnipresent.  When we reify these ideas, intensifying them 
and, carrying them out⎯they become just as real as they were during the actual occasion (but in 
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the Cartesian product of another vaguely postulated unit of temporal activity as an actual 
occasion). 
Although subtle, we are greatly influenced by the conflictual two-ness schism of this 
particular technological historical epoch too.  As we have seen in some of the examples above, 
the microinsult-microinvalidation contrast can generate distorted realities. By dealing with the 
physical side of an actual occasion, i.e., culture⎯through mediums like the media, mascots, 
books, architecture, sound⎯one’s preference for specific content is not only shaped to be viewed 
a certain way, but it is interpretable under a specified Cartesian lens.  When content of the 
physical world does not reflect its conceptual pole, a demarcation is produced between the two 
poles. This reality is accounted for by the various levels, generalities, intensities and “levels of 
generalities and intensities” by which microinvalidations occur.   
According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (2010), America has the 
largest prison population per capita (Patterson, 2011: 138). Of those incarcerated, African 
Americans and Hispanic Americans, statistically speaking, far exceed the likelihood of Asian or 
White Americans in being incarcerated.  If this were not shocking enough, the U.S. Department 
of Education has even shown that in the last two decades, “racial and ethnic segregation in 
America’s public schools has increased” when compared to the 1950s and 60s (Ibid., 155).  Yet, 
racial progress is undeniable.  But with propositions such as these, it is not hard to see how a 
predicative pattern of perceptual conceptual feelings would not reflect what Derrick Bell has 
called a “flexible amnesia” for the collective black community (2004: 5). Even as Michelle 
Alexander has exclaimed in her book The New Jim Crow, “the symbolic production of race is 
partly held together by the power to define the meaning and significance of race in its time” 
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(2012: 196).  To be brief, Alexander shows that every racial caste system in the United 
States⎯from slavery to Jim and Jane Crow, to Jim and Jane Crow to this current era of mass 
incarceration⎯there has been produced some type of racial stigma” (Ibid).  To be “black” during 
the era of slavery, exclaims Alexander, “was to be a slave;” to be “black” during Jim and Jane 
Crow it was “to be a second-class citizen;” and today in this era of mass incarceration it is “to be 
a criminal” (Ibid).  Because concepts like “slave,” “second-class citizenry” and “criminal” are 
conflated with what it means to be black in America from the “outside-in,” through aesthetically 
maintained social conventions, political agendas and media elites, it tells us very little in regards 
to how we can resist microaggressive effects despite their enigmatic nature.  This is a broad 
outline of what Sue’s outside-in style of methodology demonstrates for us.  In this last section, 
however, I use a popular culture example to help illustrate the inside-out style of methodology.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Since thinking can be a substitute for action, it follows that an image can be a proposition 
for a conceptual feeling (Whitehead, 1978:184-207).  The proposition, to be presented here is 
like “cheese on a cracker,” it is “a lure for feeling” (Ibid.).  Images, unlike words, are a datum of 
objectifications with an indefinite number of interpretations.  Images refer to both temporal and 
non-temporal entities. Given both LeBron James and Mario Balotelli’s recent King Kong 
depictions, with all their determinant racial and ethnic inheritances, and the long legacy of 
slavery in American, conceptual reproductions of African Americans being depicted as 
“monkeys” undoubtedly affirms a racial microaggression. The King Kong image is a proposition 
of perpetuating racial stereotypes.  It is a stigma that constitutes the physical pole of the 
experience.  Within its presentational immediacy, is the conceptual pole as well.  During an 
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actual occasion of an experience, the subject prehends conceptual data, receiving it within a 
physical feeling. Given each actual occasion of the experience, the free play of the imagination 
receives data from the physical world, with all its subjectively inherited memories, acquired 
habits and cultural tastes.  Clearly, then, the media is a culture and seasoned medium for the 
accretion of microaggressive valuations.  For instance, not very long ago, a friend informed me, 
that there was a black couple featured in a K-Y Jelly commercial. In depicting a mode of 
ingression, i.e., a perspective⎯one of the things that happens (in addition to sparks and 
fireworks), is that a watermelon bursts.  “It was very quick,” she said, “but it was clearly a 
bursting watermelon.” Whether intentionally or not, the commercial is linking people of color 
“sexual pleasures” with watermelons, or what in some cases have been referred to as “nigger 
apples” during the Jim and Jane Crow era.  Therefore, an ingression of some kind of primitive, 
“porch monkey,” “watermelon sexuality,” has found its way into the event blackness as an 
ingredient in African American’s lives.  This is a racial microaggression.  A lot of her friends 
reportedly saw it and thought so too.  Yet, K-Y Jelly could very easily say they did not intend for 
it to be racist. The doctrine here maintained is a theory of intensity revealed in the proposition 
entertained by the prehending subject.  What then is the character assigned to the datum 
presented if it is not “the Other?”   
Now, returning to our previous popular culture example: According to a newspaper 
column in the USA Today, James told The (Cleveland) Plain Dealer he was pleased with the new 
Vogue cover, saying he was “just showing a little emotion” (Jones, 2008).  He told columnists: 
“Who cares what anyone says?” (Ibid).  Mario Balotelli, on the other hand, was outraged. 
Although, the King Kong depiction is undoubtedly a racial microaggression, the ways James and 
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Balotelli grasp the data reveals something very significant.  Because these responses are 
different, we see an actual occasion where a racial microaggression is given two different 
interpretations, i.e., microinsult-microinvalidation contrast.  Here we see that the image is not 
only different in interpretation, but more importantly, it shows a difference in subjective feeling. 
This, then, reveals an intensity, i.e., microaggressive form⎯one that comparatively is not within 
“the Other.”  Sue’s Model misses this datum of conscious experience. As previously mentioned, 
the Model is ‘merely’ a snapshot of a microaggression in its immediacy.  To judge it otherwise is 
an act of logic than of thinking.  In other words, it is a distinction between fact and form.  Datum 
“received” as experience, is initially indeterminant. But as we can clearly see with James and 
Balotelli, history has its own personal order.  Kenneth Burke put it best where he writes: 
[…] historians for the most part are relativistic.  But where one considers 
different historical characters from the standpoint of the total development, one 
could encourage each character to comment upon the other without thereby 
sacrificing a perspective upon the lot.  This could be got particularly, I think, if 
historical characters themselves (i.e., periods or cultures treated as “individual 
persons”) were considered never to begin or end, but rather to change in intensity 
of poignancy (emphasis included; 1989:256). 
 
Given this Jamesian and Balotellian imagery of the microinsult-microinvalidation contrast, self is 
the personal order of occasions that have been serially threaded together throughout the passage 
of time. The images themselves refurbish the intensity of a substantive metaphysics in its literary 
experience that regenerates logical subjects into some type of vaguely postulated “Washington-
Du Bois imagery.”  This fracturing perpetuates a dialectical relation in perception as well as in 
thinking.  However, if we take away the color scheme for a moment, to clear away some of the 
ambiguity of a microinvalidating reality, we notice that this type of dichotomized perception 
does not simply belong to African Americans experiences.  Rather, the point is that the 
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microaggression works idiosyncratically across various demographics. The intensity here 
revealed is based on the individual subject and not a determinant categorical scheme of what is 
and is not perceived in a more unifying and encompassing scheme of reality. It is simply one of a 
multiplicity of particulars contrasted in a personal order of perception, namely, in propositions 
that were highlighted in order for it to be uniformly or systematically indicated as such.  The 
predicate (i.e., race-based, gender-based, sexual-orientation based, disability-based, class-based, 
etc.) personally ascribed to the subjective form is part of the intensity that invariably ends up 
qualifying the character of the microaggression.  As we have saw in the vignettes, no incident 
was definitively determinable as a specific microaggression form. It is simply a balanced 
measure of “valuing up” or “valuing down” the complex form of the personal order by the 
prehending subject.  When viewing these entities separately, it is not hard to see that one either 
sees the perils of racism as alive and well or as dated and obsolete. Double consciousness, first 
and foremost, is a racialized consciousness.  Today, in its transmutated form, it does not simply 
belong to the oppressed, but after years of civil unrest and struggles, it is now observable in the 
oppressors as a white racial frame.  Feagin was undoubtedly understood this point because he 
coined the idea and theorized the concept in a way that reinterpreted Du Bois’s idea from an 
“outside-in” style methodology. The reader has more than likely heard some white Americans 
insisting on their experiences with reverse discrimination.  Thus, we live in a time where the 
oppressor feeling is that he or she denies responsibility or guilt for the dark, bloody horrors of 
American slavery.  Yet, this does not say much about the effects of their unjust enrichment. And 
the disinherited, it has been often said that they claim a victimology for their lowly conditions.  
Upon higher levels of consciousness, i.e., persons who rightly prefer of a moral order over and 
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against the predominance of an excessively aesthetic one, may notice that the oppressor’s burden 
of “[white] guilt,” and the oppressed’s “racial paranoia” are actually two different sides to the 
same coin.  Given these academic euphemisms, we notice that “guilt” is easier to dismiss than 
“paranoia,” especially given the psychological wages afforded to white Americans in our current 
society.  What is even more troubling is that double consciousness is considered a consciousness 
“of the oppressed,” and the “white racial frame,” describes consciousness in white Americans.  If 
we do not insist on illuminating and eliminating the various modes of conflation-ingression 
contrast that spawn these very dangerous microinvalidating realities, we are failing to efficiently 
eliminate the reproduction of oppressive systems.  Many of these microinvalidations, in large 
part, have to do with the underrepresentation of marginalized groups’ perspectives in essential 
areas like education.  
 
FURTHER STUDIES  
As I have attempted to demonstrate, and as many of us all know, the issue of 
consciousness is sticky.  However, I find it important to remind us that the process that I 
conjectured above with Jamesian and Balotelli imagery is not consciousness, but rather a 
conscious snapshot that helps point to an event or what happened from the subject’s adjectival 
perspective.  It does create a consciousness.  Sue and I both agree on this.  But because human 
beings are conscious, and they do in fact engage in the act of reflection, they will begin to notice 
microinvalidations more through the inside-out style that I am suggesting. It is a reflection and at 
the same time, it provides an ability to reflect.  The question then is:  What do you do with the 
consciousness that it creates?  No one helps illustrate this important point of the two styles 
‘together’ in its subjective harmony better than abolitionist and reformer Frederick Douglass 
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(1818-1895).  In his autobiography My Bondage and My Freedom (1855), Douglass sets up an 
instructive analogy for our concluding thoughts with his recollections of life on the slave 
plantation.  There, Douglass tells us how personal relationships between the slave and his 
overseer in the era of slavery have served the aim of an oppressive system.  In Douglass’s view, 
one was either a slave to the slavemaster or to the slavemaster’s proxy.  This undoubtedly is an 
absolutist worldview.  However, Douglass tells us about a fight with the slavebreaker, Covey.  
After Douglass successfully defends himself in the fight, he is transformed (from a brute to a 
person).  As Douglass retells it, “I was a changed being after that fight” (1987: 151).  Here, 
Douglass not only claims his independence and freedom, but he also reveals to us a new form of 
resistance.  Douglass no longer felt subject to another’s will, for he had discovered in the 
conflict, a limit to the slavemaster’s domination.  Douglass had contacted mental freedom.  With 
this, Douglass begins to radically reconstruct his thinking.  Douglass certainly understood that he 
was bound by fact to slavery, but in form he was not.   Free of the charges of Du Boisian double 
consciousness and the seemingly sycophancy of Washington’s unwitty submission, Douglass’s 
account serves both extrinsic and intrinsic ends.  We see the prisoner move from a prison to, one 
of what the prisoner sees in a very subtle manner and intensity.  This subtly, or what I have come 
to understand as a microinvalidation, gives way to considerations of beauty that it does not give 
to moral law.  An aesthetic order is just simply Nazi, Germany all over again.  Moral order, 
however, is binding on all persons at all times.  More importantly, moral ends derive from 
feeling.   
In sum, a traditional education is an absolutist geometric structure adjusted for, but 
indifferent to, acts of justice by Douglass’s account.  Like Sue’s methodological style, traditional 
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education is viewed by cultural fact, adjustable by an aesthetic order, and comprised of 
impersonal surface categories of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. This inevitably takes 
precedence over a person’s talents and abilities.  It was not until Douglass defended himself 
against Covey that algebraic structures of a moral order begin to emerge (just like how and what 
we come into contact with in the Jamesian and Balotelli conjecture).  After the conflictual two-
ness, Douglass was not only able to reflect after his fight, he was able to redefine persons and 
limit the oppressor’s form of domination.   
In an oppressive society, the true slave education⎯i.e., the wretched and the disinherited 
of the earth⎯comes from the “inside-out.”  Given this, we penetrate the surface of reality, to the 
beyond, into the sublimity and depth of our humanity and personhood because, as Douglass 
shows us: Education is a process.  It is a process of unlearning and relearning.  But for the 
oppressed, we must remember it is also a process of relearning and unlearning.   
If consciousness is cyclical (which I am arguing that it is), we can get readers to contact 
feeling and reflect on what happened.  Through an “inside-out” style methodology, may be a 
useful exercise to consider in psychotherapeutic models.  That way, we get people to start 
contacting the microaggressive moment as feeling, and thus⎯ to become more aware of what 
they feel at that moment and why.  When people reflect, they focus on other things like inquiry, 
difficult dialogues, memory and signification and meaning.  With this, we can generate a radical 
reconstructionist view that can help others resuscitate the suffocation of their own identities and, 
to focus on different response classes of the sociological imagination in a technologically-driven 
society. 
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Table 1: Microaggression theme adopted from Sue and Capodilupo (2008)  
Microaggressive Theme Definition 
Use of Sexist/Heterosexual  
Language 
Microinvalidation which highlights term that exclude, ignore, 
deny, negate, neglect, invalidate or degrade women and 
LGBT individuals. 
Denial of Individual 
Racism/Sexism/Heterosexism 
Closely related to the theme of colorblindness, this 
microinvalidation is a form of abnegation which involves an 
individual’s denial of personal association with racism, 
sexism, and heterosexism 
Myth of Meritocracy 
This theme asserts that race, gender, and sexual orientation 
are not seen as inhibitors to one’s life world chances or 
successes. 
Pathologizing Cultural 
Values/Communication 
Styles 
This microinsult works under the belief that cultural styles of 
White, male, and straight groups are normative and that 
people of color, females, and LGBT individuals are somehow 
abnormal.  It sends metamessages to assimilate and 
acculturate, while devaluing other cultural values. 
Second-Class Citizen 
Second-class citizenry is a microinsult that contains an 
unconscious message that certain groups are less worthy, less 
important, less deserving, and are inferior being that they 
deserve discriminatory treatment. 
Traditional Gender Role 
Prejudicing and Stereotyping This occurs when expectations of traditional roles or 
stereotypes are conveyed. 
Sexual Objectification 
Sexual objectification is the process by which women are 
transformed into “objects” or property at the sexual disposal 
or benefit of men. 
Assumption of Abnormality 
This theme is related to the perception that something about a 
person’s race, gender, sexual orientation is abnormal, deviant, 
and pathological. 
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Table 2: The Microaggression Process Model as proposed by Sue (2010) 
Domain        Explanation         Example 
Phase 1: Incident 
An event or situation 
experienced by the 
participant 
Verbal 
Nonverbal/Behavioral 
Environmental 
Phase 2: Perception 
Participant’s belief about 
whether or not the 
incident was racially 
motivated 
Responses reflect: 
Yes/No/Unsure, 
Questioning  
Phase 3: Reaction 
Participant’s immediate 
response to the incident 
Healthy Paranoia 
Sanity Check 
Empowering and Validating 
Self 
Rescuing Offenders 
Phase 4: Interpretation 
The meaning the 
participant makes of the 
incident, answering such 
questions as: Why did 
the event occur?  What 
were the person’s 
intentions? 
You Do Not Belong 
You Are Abnormal 
You Are Intellectually 
Inferior 
You Are Not Trustworthy 
You Are All The Same 
Phase 5: Consequence 
Behavioral, emotive, or 
thought processes which 
develop over time as a 
result of said incident. 
Powerlessness 
Invisibility 
Forced Compliance, Loss of 
Integrity 
Pressure To Represent 
One’s Group 
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